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ANGEL, SEED AND FOUNDERS INFLUENCE ON FINTECH FUNDING:  
AN EMERGING MARKET CONTEXT. 
By GIAQUINTO LUISA H. 
This study examines the difference between FinTechs that received private equity 
and venture capital finance with those that did not receive. We test this with a 
sample of 2,524 companies across 76 countries over 2008-2018. We find that 
country-specific determinants of start-up funding are also relevant to FinTechs. 
Furthermore, companies in financing and payments categories are more likely to 
receive funding. We show a positive relationship between having received an 
angel and a seed round with follow-on finance, and a negative relationship with 
having a single founder. The impact of the seed finance and the single founder is 
weaker in an emerging market.   
Keywords: FinTech, Start-up Funding, CrunchBase, Early-stage Finance 
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1. Introduction 
 Start-ups have attracted public and academic attention over the last years. If new 
ventures are beneficial for economic growth because of job creation, and of innovation spread 
(Rajan and Zingales, 1998). Then, FinTechs have even more impact on the economy by 
reducing inefficiency, and by increasing the access to financial products (Leong et al, 2017). 
FinTechs may reshape the financial industry with better quality service at lower costs (Lee and 
Shin, 2018). According to PWC (2016), 83% of financial institutions activity are at risk by 
FinTechs, and Goldman Sachs (2015) estimates that the FinTech sector worth $4.7 trillion.  
 Just like any start-up, FinTechs face high failure risk mainly when early-stage finance 
is not available to support the first years of negative cash flow (Hoenig, and Henkel, 2014). 
Private Equity (PE) and Venture capital (VC) firms fill the funding gap for those high-risk high-
growth companies (Gompers and Lerner, 1998). According to CB Insights (2018), FinTech 
funding reached a record of $27.4 billion. Early-stage investment has long been an understudied 
subject due to the lack of data. CrunchBase has foster researchers on corporate financing over 
the last decade (Dalle at al., 2017). Investigating the determinants of PE/VC investment is 
crucial for policymakers to design public incentives for entrepreneurship, and for entrepreneurs 
who are looking for financing their business (Alemany and Villanueva, 2014). 
 We followed 2,524 FinTechs, for 10 years, to identify what differs between companies 
that received and did not receive PE/VC finance. We categorized FinTechs into five groups to 
control for the product or service offered. We tested two hypotheses: first, the positive impact 
of the angel or the seed as a quality certification for follow-on finance (Werth and Boeert, 2013; 
Croce et al., 2018; Lerner et al., 2018). Second, the negative influence of having a single 
founder on PE/VC finance compared to team founders which enjoy the complementary 
networking, skills, and industry knowledge (Stam and Schutjens., 2005; Spiegel at al., 2013).  
 Our empirical model includes many of the macroeconomic determinants already tested 
in previous studies, namely GDP growth, economic freedom, financial development, R&D 
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expenses, and corporate taxes (Gompers and Lerner, 1998; Félix et al., 2007; Cherif and 
Gazdar, 2011; Nofsinger and Wang, 2011; Mihai, 2015). This work contributes to the existing 
literature in FinTech by investigating if start-up funding determinants are also applicable to this 
sector. To date, relatively few studies have investigated the FinTech market in its entirety and 
using quantitative models (Cumming and Schwienbacher, 2018).  
 FinTechs have become a global phenomenon as more deals are taking place in South 
America and Asia (CB Insights, 2018). Indeed, the need for financial inclusion is preeminent 
in emerging markets where the percentage of the unbanked population is higher and small firms 
face more credit restrictions (Zalan and Toufaily, 2017). A growing number of papers on 
entrepreneurial finance uses cross-countries panel data. Groh and Wallmeroth (2016) suggest 
that venture capital determinants differ according to the developmental stage of a country, both 
in the direction and the magnitude.   
 The originality of this paper is not only to focus on a specific industry - the FinTech 
sector - but also to investigate how the developmental stage of a country interferes in some 
companies-specific characteristics. The developmental stage of a country interferes in its 
entrepreneurial ecosystem which in turn interferes in the entrepreneurial funding. Our sample 
comprises 76 countries which we split into emerging and developed market according to the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) GDP per capita definition of 2018. Therefore, we create 
three interaction terms between the angel, the seed and the single founder with the emerging 
market.  
 
2. Literature review and hypothesis formulation 
 FinTech, the short for Financial Technology firms, involves the design and the delivery 
of financial products through technology (Leong et al., 2017). The term FinTech is from the 
early 1990s when a Citigroup project created the abbreviation for “Financial Services 
Technology Consortium” (Arner et al., 2015).  FinTech got momentum, from 2008 to 2018, 
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global searches on the Google browser for the term “FinTech” have grown 25 times according 
to Google Trends. In 2008, FinTech investment was still only a $1 billion business. In 2017, 
however, it reached a record of $27.4 billion (CB Insights, 2018).   
 FinTech covers the entire scope of services traditionally provided by the financial 
industry (Arner et al., 2015). For instance, lending, payment, insurance, wealth management, 
and so on. Those companies usually have a disruptive business model which cuts costs. 
Operational efficiency comes from branchless banking, transformation in customer acquisition 
or retention, real-time transactions, credit monitoring, fewer regulators barriers and, fewer 
legacy IT systems. The Fintech revolution may force the whole financial sector to improve the 
quality of services (Lee and Shin, 2018). According to PWC (2016), 83% of the activities 
performed in the financial institutions are at risk by FinTechs, and Goldman Sachs (2015) 
estimates that the FinTech sector worth $4.7 trillion. 
 FinTech expansion has the potential to fill the gap in available financial services, to both 
retail and business customers, therefore, reducing existing inefficiencies.  These inefficiencies 
are typically high in emerging countries where small business face more credit constraints and 
the population has less access to financial products.  For instance, The Global Findex a World 
Bank database shows that 94% of adults have an account in developed economies, while only 
63% do in emerging markets. According to Leong (2017), Financial services can help drive 
development by reducing the cost of receiving payment or by allowing people to save and invest 
in their health and education.  For instance, FinTechs were able to increase the offer of small 
loans as the technology has reduced transaction costs.  
 FinTechs benefits are conditional to their survival. CB Insights (2017) reported the top 
20 reasons for start-up failure and placed “run out of cash” in the second position. Start-ups 
have limited borrowing capacity because of intangible assets and expected years of negative 
earnings. FinTechs face even stronger funding constraints for financial sector regulations 
(Haddad and Hornuf, 2016). Private Equity (PE) and Venture capital (VC) firms offer a 
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financing option for start-ups which are unlikely to receive a bank loan (Gompers and Lerner, 
1998). Banks loan usually offer a debt against the future payment of a principal plus interest, 
while PE/VC invest capital purchasing equity stakes. They typically keep the equity for a 
limited period, around 10 years, with the aim to increase the company value before they exit 
(Tykvova, 2018). PE/VC firms are intermediaries that invest capital from investors, such as 
pension funds, family office, and insurance companies into financing young firms with high-
growth potential (Hoenig and Henkel, 2014).  
 Accessing PE/VC capital is a very competitive race for entrepreneurs who are looking 
for capital. Investors initial screening is a rapid review of multiple projects to assess the one 
that merits further analysis, 70% of the rejections occur at first sight (Riding et al., 2007). 
PE/VC firms face difficulty in assessing start-up potential because of information asymmetry 
within entrepreneurs. This asymmetry increases with the lack of track performance or revenue 
(Nofsinger and Wang, 2011). To evaluate a start-up potential, investors observe attributes 
presumably correlated with further performance (Stuart et al., 1999). Early stage investors 
typically analyze the quality of the entrepreneur, the attractiveness of the market, and the 
characteristics of the product (Alemany and Villanueva, 2014).  
 Angel and seed investors are the first sources of external capital to start-ups. Business 
angels are wealthy former entrepreneurs who place their own money into early stage 
entrepreneurial ventures, while seed represents a more formal option for early stage capital 
made by professional investors (Croce et al., 2018). The funding process may start with a 
business angel, then, seed finance to finally reach venture capital and private equity; the latter 
can have follow-on rounds in series A, B, C. However, some start-ups may directly receive seed 
or PE/VC finance without having an angel or a seed experience. Sequential investment occurs 
because of complementary gains. To exemplify, angel typically have limited capital and venture 
capital provide growth opportunities for the firms in which they have invested in (Croce et al., 
2018). 
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 Angel and seed investors learn about new opportunities through referrals and business 
associations groups (Alemany and Villanueva, 2014). They face less agency problem in 
monitoring a start-up because they heavily rely on relational governance (Croce et al., 2018). 
Having entrepreneurial experience, angel and seed are typically active investors who monitor 
strategy and investment decisions to support start-up growth (Cherif and Gazdar, 2011). In 
addition, they provide access to consultants, to investment bankers, and to lawyers (Gompers 
and Lerner, 1998). 
 Early stage investors have a positive impact on the growth of firms they fund, both in 
terms of performance and survival (Lerner et al., 2018). They play a crucial role in expanding 
start-up networking and in facilitating further investment. A start-up financed by a well-
connected business angel is more likely to receive subsequent funding rounds (Werth and 
Boeert, 2013). Given the high information asymmetry between PE/VC firms and entrepreneurs 
(Stuart et al., 1999), having received an angel and seed round provide a valuable signal to 
entrant investors, similar to a certification of the deal quality (Croce et al., 2018).  
H1: Angel positively impact the probability of receiving PE/VC Funds 
H2: Seed positively impact the probability of receiving PE/VC Funds 
 Investors use factors of the entrepreneurial team as the minimum qualification during 
the screening stage. Expected future return and reputation serve as signals of positive returns. 
(Gompers and Lerner, 1998).  The educational and the professional experience of the founding 
team attracts venture capital attention as an observable sign of quality (Hoenig, and Henkel, 
2014; Gompers and Lerner, 1998). For instance, a venture managed by an experienced founder 
get in average 4.44% more external financing (Nofsinger and Wang, 2011).  An experiment 
with the crowd-funding AngelList revealed that business angels respond to information about 
the founding team (Bernstein at al.,2016). The platform has sent e-mails to potential investors 
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providing information about new opportunities and recorded that they usually decided to learn 
more about the founding team (Bernstein at al.,2016). 
 Team start-up has the benefit to complement founders networking and skills (Spiegel at 
al., 2013). Multiple founders should increase the number of skills and industry-specific 
knowledge available in the start-up which are stronger predictors of performance. Team start-
ups have significantly higher capital than single founder (Stam and Schutjens, 2005). Team 
founders appear to achieve better performance than single founder start-ups. For instance, a 
research comparing 90 teams and 1196 single start-ups in The Netherlands showed that team 
start-ups perform better: only 13.5% of team companies closed against 18% of the single 
founder, and 4.5% of team start-ups got sold against only 2% of the single founder (Stam and 
Schutjens, 2015). 
H3: Single founder negatively impact the probability of receiving PE/VC Funds 
 The main originality of this paper is to investigate how the impact of the angel, the seed, 
and the single founder differ according to the developmental stage of a country. To the best of 
our knowledge, no previous research has focused on this question. The fact that countries have 
different entrepreneurial ecosystems inspired the formulation of hypothesis four, five, and six. 
The work from Groh and Wallmerot (2016) is a source of inspiration, they investigated the 
determinants of venture capital and concluded that the developmental stage of a country impacts 
the magnitude and direction of funding determinants. 
 The entrepreneurial ecosystem differs among countries, credit abundancy in developed 
countries, such as The United States, reduces start-ups need to raise an angel round before 
getting seed funds (Lerner et al., 2018). Hence, angel finance may have a strong impact in the 
emerging market. As new entrepreneurs face more constraints accessing external sources of 
capital in emerging markets, the seed market is smaller and more competitive (Wu and Si, 
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2016). According to Lerner (2018), entrepreneurs who are looking for capital in an emerging 
market may self-censored themselves because of the less favorable entrepreneurial investment 
climate. Thus, constraints in the offer of seed investment weaker its impact in the probability 
of receiving further financing.   
H4: Angel has a strong positive impact on the probability of receiving PE/VC funds in an 
emerging economy 
H5: Seed has a weaker positive impact on the probability of receiving PE/VC funds in an 
emerging economy 
 Emerging countries typically have a weaker investor protection and law enforcement 
facing higher agency problem between investors and entrepreneurs (Groh and Wallmeroth, 
2016). To deal with a riskier ecosystem, investors select deals that usually occurs between 
entrepreneurs whom they share a social connection. Social connection serves as a guarantee of 
good behavior, reducing agency problem (Croce et al., 2018). As deals are more driven by 
social connection than management skills or industry knowledge, single founder negative 
impact in the probability of receiving PE/VC funds is weaker in emerging markets. 
H6: Single founder has a weaker negative impact on the probability of receiving PE/VC funds 
in an emerging economy 
 During the screening process, investors not only evaluates the founding team but also 
the product (Alemany and Villanueva, 2014). PE/VC firms may invest strictly in one vertical 
because of industry knowledge, while others may use a multi-vertical strategy to mitigate risk. 
According to Roeder et al. (2018), there is a significant relationship between product or service 
offered and the probability of receiving funds. Thus, we may expect that FinTechs in some 
categories attracts more investment than others.  
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 Regarding the attractiveness of the country, GDP growth has a positive impact on the 
venture capital and private equity industry (Gompers and Lerner, 1998; Félix et al., 2007; Cherif 
and Gazdar, 2011). Start a new business is more attractive in a growing economy than during a 
recession. Economic growth creates new business opportunities for entrepreneurs and it creates 
a more optimistic scenario. An improve in growth forecast would increase entrepreneur 
willingness to quite a job and apply to a project (Gompers and Lerner, 1998).  
 Economic Freedom is a measure of property rights, financial freedom, and trade 
freedom. Legal rights have a positive effect on start-up financing because it protects borrowers 
and lenders (Groh and Wallmeroth, 2016). For instance, companies in countries with best 
property protection have in average 44% of external finance against an average of 38% in the 
other countries (Nofsinger and Wang, 2011). However, corruption negatively impacts 
entrepreneurship as it increases uncertainty and the cost of doing business when firms need to 
bribe officials (Cherif and Gazdar, 2011).  
 FinTechs are more likely to receive funding in countries with better Financial 
development which comprises financial institutions, market, and products. According to 
Cumming and Schwienbacher (2018), FinTechs may get a competitive advantage when located 
with the main industry player. Having access to human or financial resources generates 
economies of scale. The author used the Global Financial Center Index 18 and showed that 
FinTech investments are more pronounced in countries with a major financial center. 
Considering financial market and products, an active stock market facilitates successful PE/VC 
exit through initial public offerings (Haddad and Hornuf, 2016). Stock Market increases venture 
capital investment (Gompers and Lerner, 1998; Cherif and Gazdar, 2011; Tykvova, 2018), and 
it is one of the main drivers of private equity activity in Europe (Mihai, 2015).  
 Research and Development expenses (R&D) positively influence PE/VC investment 
(Cherif and Gazdar, 2011). A higher level of R&D expenses increases the number of 
entrepreneurs with promising ideas to create a new business. Similarly, some authors 
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investigate the positive impact of patents and of the innovation index from INSEAD (Groh and 
Wallmeroth, 2016).  
 Corporate tax negatively impacts PE/VC financing. On one hand, corporate tax reduces 
investors return. On the other hand, it reduces the incentives for a worker to become 
entrepreneurs (Gompers and Lerner, 1998). To exemplify, many countries have put tax 
incentives in place to encourage angel investments (Lerner et al., 2018). 
 Our model does not consider the following country-specific variables. First, the 
unemployment rate has a limited impact on private equity activity (Mihai, 2015). Neither it is 
statistically significant for FinTechs which opportunity instead of necessity is the main driver 
(Haddad and Hornuf, 2016). Second, the interest rate does not significantly affect venture 
capital activity (Cherif and Gazdar, 2011) nor private equity activity (Mihai, 2015). Last, Total 
Entrepreneurial Activity Index (TEA) from Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) has an 
insignificant impact on investor financing (Félix et al., 2007).  According to the author, the 
TEA index captures both high and low growth entrepreneurial activity, however, investors are 
only interested in the later one. 
 
3. Methodology 
3.1.  Data and variables 
 CrunchBase is our single-source of company-specific data. It contains detailed 
information on FinTechs profile and their financing rounds (Haddad and Hornuf, 2016).  
Several studies integrated CrunchBase data with other sources (Dalle at al., 2017). We pooled 
country-specific data from an array of sources. First, GDP Growth is from The World Bank and 
OECD national accounts. Second, The Economic Freedom is from The Heritage Foundation. 
Third, Financial development index is from the International Monetary Funds (IMF). Fourth, 
R&D expenses are from the UNESCO Institute for Statistics. Last, the Corporate tax is from 
the Doing Business Project of the World Bank. 
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 Founded in 2007, CrunchBase increased in coverage since then (Dalle at al., 2017). The 
database offers free academic research access attracting attention not only from the PE/VC 
industry but also from scholars. The database has three fundamental groups of information: 
company, people, and funding rounds. Select contributors can add information to the 
CrunchBase platform which is then reviewed by the data set team before going online (Croce 
et al., 2018).  Thus, data accuracy and completeness vary, and some specific dimensions have 
limited information (Roeder, Jan, et al.,2018). We accessed CrunchBase data using an 
academic license, during the period between June and December 2018. 
 In CrunchBase, companies select their own category. To build our sample, we first 
filtered for the category FinTech. Although some start-ups have over to five categories and 
others have just one, we used the self-declared category. Figure 1 presents the initial selection 
of 3,454 FinTechs created between 2008 and 2016. Therefore, we cleaned all the missing 
information reducing the original sample by 27%, or 930 firms, to a final sample of 2,524 
companies. First, 94 companies have closed as operational status. Second, another 226 
companies have no information on the country of origin. Last, 610 FinTechs have no data about 
the founders. 
FIGURE 1. FINTECH FORMATION BY YEAR 
 Our dependent variable is whether the FinTech received external capital in the form of 
venture capital or private equity. This PE/VC response variable is a binary that takes 1 when 
the FinTech received capital funding in the following years until December 2018 and takes 0 
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otherwise. One limitation of this study is that some companies may still receive capital in the 
following years after 2018 since it is an uncensored panel.  
 Spiegel (2013) suggest that there is no definition of early-stages starts-ups success. 
Funding received is a metric of interim success as start-ups are more likely to survive when 
they have access to capital. Academic researches often use this metrics (Kerr at al., 2011; Croce 
et al.,2018; Lerner at al., 2018). As our sample have limited representativeness in other response 
variables: only 1.2% of FinTechs went public, 3.2% of the deals have company valuation, and 
2.7% of firms closed.  We used venture capital or private equity funding because 37% of 
FinTechs have received PE/VC. 
 Our empirical model includes 12 determinants on the probability of receiving PE/VC 
funding, including both company-specific and country-specific. Table 1 presents a summary of 
all variables. Among company-specific variables, we created a dummy variable Angel to test 
our first hypothesis. Angel takes 1 when the FinTech received angel finance and 0 otherwise. 
Similarly, for the second hypothesis, a dummy variable Seed captures FinTechs that received 
seed finance. Another dummy variable called Single Founder test our third hypothesis. It takes 
1 when the FinTech has only one declared founder in CrunchBase and 0 when it has two or 
more founders. In addition, for hypotheses four, five, and six we created an interaction term 
between the Angel, the Seed and the Single Founder with an Emerging country. Seed Emerging 
and Angel Emerging takes 1 when the FinTech location is in an emerging market and received 
angel or seed, while Single Founder Emerging captures FinTechs in an emerging market that 
has only one founder.   
 We grouped our sample into five categories of FinTechs. We used the same 
classification proposed by Roeder et al. (2018) in addition to a fifth category for 
cryptocurrencies. To exemplify, financing category contains loans, factoring, and 
crowdfunding; while payment contains mobile payments, prepaid and credit cards. Asset 
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management has companies offering robot-advice or personal finance services. Last, the other 
group contains, for instance, InsurTech and B2B solutions. We created four dummies variables 
that capture companies in financing, payment, asset management, and cryptocurrency 
categories.   
 
TABLE 1: VARIABLES  
Variables Definition Source Role Signal 
PE/VC Dummy variable that takes 1 if the FinTech received PE/VC CrunchBase 
Dependent  
Variable 
Angel Dummy variable that takes 1 if the FinTech received angel CrunchBase H1 + 
Seed Dummy variable that takes 1 if the FinTech received seed CrunchBase H2 + 
Single Founder Dummy variable that takes 1 if the FinTech has only one founder CrunchBase H3 - 
Angel Emerging 
Interaction term that takes 1 if the 
FinTech is located in an emerging 
market and received Angel 
CrunchBase H4 + 
Seed Emerging 
Interaction term that takes 1 if the 
FinTech is located in an emerging 
market and received seed 
CrunchBase H5 - 
Single Founder 
Emerging 
Interaction term that takes 1 if the 
FinTech is located in an emerging 
market and has only one founder 
CrunchBase H6 + 
Financing Dummy variable that takes 1 if the category is financing CrunchBase 
Control  
Variable 
+ 
Payment Dummy variable that takes 1 if the category is payment CrunchBase + 
Asset 
Management 
Dummy variable that takes 1 if 
the category is asset management CrunchBase + 
Cryptocurrency Dummy variable that takes 1 if the category is cryptocurrency CrunchBase + 
GDP Growth GDP difference in local currency between 2016 and 2008 
World Bank and 
OECD + 
Economic 
Freedom 
Country rank position regarding 
Economic Freedom, year of 2016 
The Heritage 
Foundation - 
Financial 
Development 
Index for financial institutions and 
market development, year of 2016 
International 
Monetary Funds + 
R&D Expenses R&D expenses as a percentage of GDP in 2015 
UNESCO Institute 
for Statistics. + 
Corporate Tax Corporate tax difference between 2016 and 2008 
The Doing 
Business project - 
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 Country-specific variables are numerical. First, GDP Growth is the GDP difference in 
local currency between 2016 and 2008. Second, The Economic Freedom Index covers 12 
freedoms such as property rights and financial freedom. It ranks countries in descending order 
where the first position means the highest levels of economic freedom. Third, Financial 
Development 2016 index measures countries depth, access, and efficiency of the financial 
institutions and market. Fourth, R&D Expenses is gross domestic expenditure on research and 
development as a percentage of GDP. It considers basic or applied research and experimental 
development. We use the last year of data 2015 as a proxy for 2016. Last, Corporate Tax is the 
difference in business profit taxes between 2016 and 2008. 
 
3.2. Econometric Model 
 In this study, we compare FinTechs that received with those that did not receive private 
equity or venture capital funds. Our panel data contains observations of 2,524 companies, from 
76 countries, for the period between 2008 and 2018. We estimate a Logit model using the Stata 
software. The dependent variable is a binary outcome, meaning 1 if the company received 
external funding and zero otherwise. We use a random-effects regression because the fixed-
effects model could not measure our control variables which are all country dependent. The 
panel data controls for the foundation year as only FinTechs that received PE/VC funds have 
the year of the deal. The analysis uses the following model: 
 𝑃𝑟(𝑦 = 1|𝑥) = 	b+ + b-𝑋- …+ b0𝑋0 + 𝜀 
 
 Model 1 reports the results for the base model, including control variables, in addition 
to the effect of the angel and the seed finance and their interactions term with the emerging 
market. In model 2, we added to the base model the single founder effect also with the emerging 
market interaction term. In models 3, we tested the base model with our six hypotheses.  
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Moreover, a residual analysis checks for error homoscedasticity hypothesis confirming the need 
for robust standard errors.  
 
4. Results 
 In our sample, 10% of the FinTechs have received an angel round, while 47% of them 
have received a seed. As for founding team, 36% of firms are single founders, while 64% have 
two or more founders. The majority of companies have two founders 37%, in line with prior 
studies where the majority of the start-ups have two co-founders (Spiegel at al., 2013). FinTechs 
typically receive capital during the first or second year, respectable 23% and 26% of deals.  
 FinTechs are spread across 76 different countries, being 34 classified as a developed 
economy and 42 as an emerging market. The classification criterion is the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) definition by GDP per capita from the year 2018. Emerging countries 
account for 15% of our sample, both as the percentage of total companies and as the percentage 
of those that received PE/VC capital. The share of FinTechs from developing countries went 
up from 12% in the first years up to 18% more recently. High deal competition in developed 
economies increased the number of deals in emerging economies where the relative price is 
lower (Minardi and Bortoluzzo, 2017).   
 Table 2 represents statistics for developed and emerging countries. All figures are in 
line with our hypotheses. FinTechs that received an angel, or a seed round show a higher 
percentage of PE/VC, namely 39% and 43%, while companies with a single founder show a 
lower percentage 29%. Regarding country developmental stage, the angel has more impact in 
an emerging market, while the seed and the single founder has less impact in an emerging 
market. According to Pearson’s Chi-squared test, the angel is not statistically significant for 
follow-on finance. Furthermore, it suggests that any variable is statistically significant in 
emerging countries.  
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TABLE 2: ANGEL, SEED AND SINGLE FOUNDER IMPACT ON RECEIVING PE/VC FUNDS 
FOR DEVELOPED AND EMERGING COUNTRIES 
Hypotheses Developed Emerging Total 
- PE/VC No PE/VC PE/VC No PE/VC PE/VC No PE/VC 
Angel 38% 62% 43% 57% 39% 61% 
No Angel 36% 64% 35% 65% 36% 64% 
 Pearson chi2 0.3309 1.2908 0.983 
Seed 44% 56% 35% 65% 43% 57% 
No Seed 30% 70% 36% 64% 31% 69% 
 Pearson chi2 43.1986*** 0.0343 36.0112*** 
Single Founder 28% 72% 36% 64% 29% 71% 
Team Founder 42% 58% 36% 64% 41% 59% 
 Pearson chi2 40.7900 *** 0.0173 35.2182*** 
Note: *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10    
Pearson Chi-square test for categorical variables 
     
 Considering the FinTech category, 31% are in financing, 19% are in payment, 11% are 
in asset management, 7% are in cryptocurrency, and 33% are in other. Over time, the share of 
FinTechs in asset management increased from 10% to 16%, in cryptocurrency it increased from 
1% to 9%. Table 3 suggests that the categories of financing and payments ventures are more 
likely to receive follow-finance compared to asset management, cryptocurrencies, and the other 
group. 
TABLE 3: CATEGORIES IMPACT ON RECEIVING PE/VC FUNDS  
- Financing Payments Asset Management Crypto. Other 
PE/VC  41% 43% 33% 32% 30% 
No PE/VC  59% 57% 67% 68% 70% 
 Table 4 presents the statistics of the country-specific variables, all figures support the 
existing literature except Corporate Taxes. First, average GDP Growth is higher for FinTechs 
that received PE/VC capital. Second, average Economic Freedom is slightly smaller for those 
with PE/VC finance suggesting that countries with a better rank of Economic Freedom 
(meaning lower position) has a positive impact on financing. Third, Financial Development is 
higher among those companies that received funds. Fourth, R&D Expenses are higher for 
FinTechs that received PE/VC. Corporate Tax contradicts the expected negative effect. Indeed, 
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companies that received PE/VC have in average a reduction of 1.7 percentage point of tax 
between 2016 and 2008 against a 2.2 from those that did not receive PE/VC.   
TABLE 4: CONTROL VARIABLE IMPACT ON RECEIVING PE/VC FUNDS  
  Average Standard Deviation Minimum  Maximum 
GDP Growth         
PE/VC 0.198 0.209 -0.059 0.886 
No PE/VC 0.177 0.177 -0.261 0.886 
Economic Freedom       
PE/VC 72.669 7.946 38.230 88.550 
No PE/VC 73.144 7.655 43.490 88.550 
Financial Development       
PE/VC 0.780 0.148 0.121 0.937 
No PE/VC 0.759 0.176 0.098 0.937 
R&D Expenses         
PE/VC 2.301 0.833 0.000 4.266 
No PE/VC 2.110 0.881 0.000 4.266 
Corporate Tax         
PE/VC -1.747 3.899 -20.900 12.800 
No PE/VC -2.231 4.665 -20.900 8.300 
 Table 5 presents correlations among country-specific variables. The correlation and VIF 
coefficients are below levels for which multicollinearity would be an issue 
TABLE 5: CORRELATION MATRIX  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
GDP Growth 1     
Economic Freedom -0.4262 1    
Financial Development -0.5424 0.6629 1   
R&D Expenses -0.3375 0.4588 0.6288 1  
Corporate Tax 0.1314 -0.1344 -0.116 0.2149 1 
VIF 1.44 1.83 2.76 1.94 1.2 
Note: Variance inflation factor (VIF) test for multicollinearity   
 Our regressions estimate the impact of company-specific and country-specific 
determinants in the probability of receiving PE/VC funding. Table 6 presents the  determinants 
of PE/VC funds.. We find that the signal of the angel and the angel interaction term with 
emerging market coefficients are in line with hypotheses one and four. However, these 
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coefficients are not statistically significant. Kerr at al. (2011) also suggest that business angel 
is not statistically significant in accessing follow-on financing. Difficulties in identifying the 
business angel population may offset the impact of the angel investor (Croce et al., 2018). For 
instance, the business angel presence in our sample 10% which is smaller than the seed 
penetration of 47%. 
 Having received s seed finance has a positive and statistically significant influence on 
follow-on PE/VC rounds, we do not reject our second hypothesis. Indeed, having received seed 
generates an increase of 61% in the odds of receiving PE/VC capital. This result is in line with 
the existing literature on the seed role as a certification of deal quality and as an active investor 
providing FinTechs access to additional networking such as consultants or investment bankers 
(Gompers and Lerner, 1998; Croce et al., 2018). Considering the developmental stage of a 
country, the seed magnitude in an emerging market is weaker compared to developed countries 
as presented in figure 2. However, the interaction term between seed and emerging market is 
not statistically significant in our model.  
FIGURE 2. SEED IMPACT ON RECEIVING PE/VC FUNDS FOR DEVELOPED AND 
EMERGING COUNTRIES 
  
Our results do not reject the third hypothesis of the single founder negative influence on PE/VC 
funding. Team founders contribute to networking, skills, and industry knowledge, attracting 
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investor attention (Stam and Schutjens., 2005; Spiegel at al., 2013). Having a single founder, 
FinTechs are 40% less likely to receive PE/VC compared to team founders. Although the 
interaction term between the single founder and an emerging country is not statistically 
significant, it has a positive coefficient suggesting a weaker influence in emerging countries 
compared to developed economies as shown in figure 3.  
 
FIGURE 3. SINGLE FOUNDER IMPACT ON RECEIVING PE/VC FUNDS FOR DEVELOPED 
AND EMERGING COUNTRIES 
  
 Individual entrepreneurial talent is likely to vary more in emerging markets where 
education is not consistent across the population (Lerner et al., 1997). This paper leaves 
unanswered the question if entrepreneurs profile differs. From our sample of 2,524 FinTechs, 
only 57% have information on founders’ education. The percentage of companies that received 
PE/VC is 43%, higher than the total sample percentage of 37%, suggesting a bias where 
companies more likely to receive PE/VC have a more complete profile in CrunchBase. From 
FinTechs with complete founder profile, the MBA/PhD percentage is 32% in developed 
countries against 25% in emerging, while the percentage of Top 200 Universities from CWUR 
rank is 44% in developed countries against 22% in emerging. These numbers suggest that 
entrepreneurial talent is more consistent in developed countries. 
 In terms of control variables, our model finds that the FinTech category influences the 
probability of receiving PE/VC funding.  More traditional categories from the financial sector, 
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namely financing and payment, attract more PE/VC capital. Financing and Payments have a 
positive and statistically significant coefficient in the three models, while asset management 
and cryptocurrencies are not statistically significant when compared to the other group. Hence, 
FinTech product or service offered influence investors decision which is in line with Roeder et 
al. (2018). 
 We find statistical significance at the 5% level in every country-specific variable except 
the corporate tax. All coefficients are in line with the existing literature. First, GDP growth 
positively influences FinTechs financing (Gompers and Lerner, 1998; Félix et al., 2007; Cherif 
and Gazdar, 2011). Second, the level of economic freedom in a country, in the form of a smaller 
rank according to The Heritage Foundation, impact PE/VC activity (Cherif and Gazdar, 2011; 
Nofsinger and Wang, 2011; Groh and Wallmeroth, 2016). Third, financial development 
positively impacts the PE/VC industry (Gompers and Lerner, 1998; Cherif and Gazdar, 2011;  
Mihai, 2015; Tykvova, 2018; Haddad and Hornuf, 2016). Last, R&D expenses positively 
impact FinTech financing (Cherif and Gazdar, 2011; Groh and Wallmeroth, 2016). 
 The corporate tax insignificant could be partially explained by the existing anomalies 
where countries with high corporate tax rates still have high entrepreneurial activity (Groh and 
Wallmeroth, 2016). The expected negative influence of corporate tax may only hold in single 
countries analysis as estimated by Gompers and Lerner (1998) using data from The United 
States.   
 As for the strength of determinants, table 6 shows that financial development and GDP 
growth are key drivers of PE/VC activity. Although FinTechs are growing fast in emerging 
markets, the market remains highly concentrated as The United States and The United Kingdom 
still accounts for 55% of FinTechs companies and 58% of FinTechs PE/VC rounds. 
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TABLE 6: DETERMINANTS OF RECEIVING PE/VC FUNDS  
Variable 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Coefficient  Odds  Coefficient  Odds Coefficient  Odds 
Angel H1 0.001 1.001 - - -0.009 0.991 
  (0.160)     (0.163)  
Seed H2 0.566*** 1.761 - - 0.478*** 1.613 
  (0.093)     (0.095)  
Single Founder H3 - - -0.603*** 0.547 -0.510*** 0.601 
     (0.100)  (0.102)  
Angel Emerging H4 0.123 1.131 - - 0.148 1.160 
  (0.361)     (0.362)  
Seed Emerging H5 -0.377 0.686 - - -0.339 0.713 
  (0.245)     (0.250)  
Single Founder Emerg. H6 - - 0.350 1.420 0.284 1.329 
     (0.248)  (0.255)  
Financing  0.460*** 1.585 0.498*** 1.645 0.471*** 1.601 
  (0.108)  (0.109)  (0.109)  
Payment  0.522*** 1.685 0.572*** 1.772 0.526*** 1.692 
  (0.125)  (0.123)  (0.125)  
Asset Management  0.019 1.019 0.068 1.071 0.033 1.034 
  (0.155)  (0.153)  (0.155)  
Cryptocurrency  0.022 1.023 0.038 1.038 0.000 1.000 
  (0.176)  (0.176)  (0.176)  
Emerging  0.292 1.340 0.039 1.040 0.161 1.175 
  (0.346)  (0.331)  (0.364)  
GDP Growth  1.234*** 3.435 1.250*** 3.491 1.264*** 3.540 
  (0.309)  (0.308)  (0.310)  
Economic Freedom -0.032** 0.969 -0.03** 0.971 -0.032** 0.968 
  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010)  
Financial Development 1.835*** 6.262 1.944*** 6.986 1.916*** 6.793 
  (0.447)  (0.449)  (0.451)  
R&D Expenses  0.324*** 1.382 0.308*** 1.361 0.306*** 1.358 
  (0.082)  (0.083)  (0.082)  
Corporate Tax  0.003 1.003 0.002 1.002 0.001 1.001 
  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011)  
Constant   -1.129 0.323 -0.885 0.413 -0.917 0.400 
  (0.815)   (0.814)   (0.808)   
Sample Size   2524  2524  2524  
Wald chi2(10)   137.67***  137.53***  160.33***  
Correct Classification   64.5%   64.3%   64.3%   
Note: *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10 
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 To test for the robustness of our regressions, we applied a Breusch-Pagan (1979) and we 
rejected the null-hypotheses of constant variance (homoskedasticity) with a p-value of 0.0000. 
Hence, the Breusch-Pagan test confirms the need to use robust standard error in the regression. 
A Wald Chi-Squared tested for the significance of our explanatory variables and we rejected 
the null-hypotheses of no significance with a p-value of 0.000. Comparing the three models, 
the correct classification percentage of 64% shows an acceptable and similar predictive 
accuracy. Furthermore, a slightly higher Wald Chi-Squared of 160 is in favor of our third 
model. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 FinTechs are attracting growing interest because of their ability to generate economic 
growth and financial inclusion. However, FinTechs benefits are conditional to their survival. 
Not only for their capital but also for their previous entrepreneurial experience, PE/VC 
investors increase the survival likelihood. As 70% of the PE/VC rejections occur at first sight 
(Riding et al., 2007), investigating the determinants of PE/VC is important for entrepreneurs 
looking for capital and for policymakers to design public incentives. 
 In recent years, FinTech funding raised a significant amount of money reaching a record 
of $27.4 billion according to CB Insights (2018). We provide evidence on the growth of 
emerging market deals, from 2008 to 2018 the share of emerging countries went up from 12% 
to 18% in our sample. This pattern is consistent with other cross-countries investigations (Groh 
and Wallmeroth, 2016; Minardi and Bortoluzzo, 2017).  
 This article analyzes the determinants of FinTech funding using a random-effects model 
on a panel data containing 2,524 companies, covering 76 countries, for the period from 2008 to 
2018. Our empirical model has 12 determinants on the probability of receiving PE/VC funding, 
including company-specific and country-specific variables. Research has shown that GDP 
growth, economic freedom, financial development, and R&D expenses are statistically 
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significant for start-up funding (Gompers and Lerner, 1998; Félix et al., 2007; Cherif and 
Gazdar, 2011; Nofsinger and Wang, 2011; Mihai, 2015). Our findings confirmed that these 
country-specific determinants are also relevant in the FinTech industry. Surprisingly, we found 
that the corporate tax is not statistically significant. This result suggests future research on the 
impact of corporate tax reductions. For instance, investigate PE/VC activity after corporate 
taxes reduction using a single country database or clustering countries according to their taxes 
level.   
 Considering company-specific determinants, we control for the category using four 
dummies: financing, payment, asset management, and cryptocurrency. We confirmed the 
increase in the creation of asset management and cryptocurrency companies, their share went 
up from 10% to 21%. However, these categories are not statistically significant in the 
probability of receiving PE/VC capital. FinTechs in financing and payment categories are the 
majority of our sample, these categories are positive and statistically significant in the 
probability of receiving PE/VC follow-on finance. 
 We tested for the impact of the angel and the seed investors. The impact of having 
received an angel finance is positive, however not statistically significant. Existing difficulties 
in identifying the business angel population may partially reduce its impact (Croce et al., 2018). 
The seed positive influence in FinTech PE/VC funding reinforces that incentives to facilitate 
the startup ecosystem are beneficial to economic growth. Our finding supports public policies, 
including, but not limited to, the creation of incubators, hubs, grants, and, mentoring programs.  
 Our finding endorses not only that FinTechs should apply for the seed funding but also 
that they should look for co-founders with complementary skills. As team size contributes to 
entrepreneurial talent, policymakers can influence it by providing differential tax benefits to 
team founders start-ups (Mayer-Haug et al., 2013). This paper leaves unanswered the questions 
of how education and working experience impacts the probability of receiving PE/VC funds. 
CrunchBase platform has information on founder profile, however, only 56% of our sample has 
 
 
25 
education and 14% has working experience. In both cases, the percentage of PE/VC finance 
was significantly higher than the total sample. Thus, we decided not to use this information. 
Further research should combine information from CrunchBase together with other sources of 
founder profile. For instance, Spiegel at al. (2013) have combined CrunchBase and LinkedIn 
data.  
 Overall, this research finds that FinTech funding determinants have a similar magnitude 
and direction with those from start-ups. Although FinTechs become a global phenomenon, the 
market is still highly concentrated in countries with a strong financial industry.  Entrepreneurs 
that attempt to found FinTechs in emerging markets will face more constraints in uncertainty 
or credit availability. Our investigation suggests that the role of seed as a quality certification 
and team founder as complementary skills is weaker in emerging markets, however, they are 
not statically significant.  
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